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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
O·F THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARTIN MACHINERY, INC., 
Plaintiff arnd Respondent, 
-vs.-
STREVELL-P ATERSON 
FINANCE COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
RALPH A. SLEETER, JR., 
Defendarnt. 
Case 
No. 8784 
Appellant's Brief 
STA'rEl\1ENT OF FACTS 
This appeal is taken by Strevell-Paterson Finance 
Company from a Judgment granting Summary Judg-
ment in favor of the Plaintiff and against this Defendant. 
The parties will be referred to as they appeared in 
the Court below. Martin Machinery, Inc., was the Plain-
tiff below and Strevell-Paterson Finance Company was 
one Defendant and Ralph A. Sleeter, Jr., the other. This 
appeal is taken by Strevell-Paterson Finance Company 
only. 
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The record shows that the Defendant Ralph A. Sleet-
er, Jr., was operating a cleaning establishment in Salt 
Lake County known as the Rainbow Cleaners (R. 16). 
On or about October 15, 1955, Mr. Sleeter needed some 
additional equipment to operate his business. Mr. C. M. 
Robinson contacted Mr. Sleeter about the equipment 
needed, and on October 15, 1955, had Mr. Sleeter sign the 
agreement which is the subject of this dispute (R. 16-17). 
The Plaintiff, Martin 1Iachinery, Inc., is a foreign cor-
poration and is not qualified to do business in the State 
of Utah. :1ir. Robins on was the exclusive sales represen-
tative in the State of Utah for the Plaintiff (R. 14). The 
one piece of equipment \Yhich ~Ir. Sleeter sought to pur-
chase \vas located in 11ontrose, Colorado, at the time of 
the execution of the agreement (R. 16). Concurrently 
with the signing of the agreement heretofore referred to, 
~Ir. Robinson had ~Ir. Sleeter sign \\hat appears to be a 
bill of sale on eight items of equipment already owned 
by l\Ir. Sleeter and located in his place of business at 2497 
South State Street, Salt Lake Cit:~, lTtah. (See Exh. at-
tached to Affidavit R. 18; R. 16.) In order to secure the 
payment of the one item "Thich ~Ir. Sleeter sought to pur-
chase, these eight items ,,-ere placed on the purchase con-
tract under a heading of '• R.ewrite of Jiachinery in 
Plant." These items \\-ere~ neYer moved from the plant 
here in Salt Lake Cit~T· The~- ''Tere added to the contract 
solely for the purpose of giYing security to the seller of 
the one item on the contract as a ''Chattel Mortgage and 
St\curity'' (R ~4). TlH•reafter, l\Ir. Sleeter borrowed 
$336.00 from Stre,-ell-Paterson Finance Company and 
gave them a Chattel :11:ortgage on an item of equipment 
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not covered by Plaintiff's agreement, and on the 2nd day 
of October, 1956, Mr. Sleeter borrowed $2,016.00 from 
the Defendant Strevell-Paterson Finance Company and 
gave them a Chattel Mortgage on ail of the items shown 
on the agreement dated October 15, 1955 (R. 10-12). On 
August 9, 1957, the Plaintiff filed an action to recover all 
of the items of equipment shown on the October 15, 1955, 
agreement (R. 1-3). This Defendant answered and assert-
ed its claim to the said equipment and sought to foreclose 
on its Chattel Mortgages (R. 7-12). On August 21, 1957, 
Mr. Sleeter filed bankruptcy and included both of these 
claims in his schedule (R. 23). The Plaintiff never filed 
its instrument with the County Recorder of Salt Lake 
County, as required for Chattel Mortgages by U.C.A. 
1953, 9-1-1 (2). (R. 20) Both instruments of the Defend-
ant were filed as required by law (R. 21-22). 
On October 1, 1957, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment supported by an Affidavit of Mr. C. 
Mardee Robinson to the effect that he was the sales rep-
resentative of the Plaintiff in the State of Utah, and that 
he procured and submitted to the Plaintiff the agree-
ment signed by Mr. Sleeter on October 15, 1955 (R. 13-17). 
The Defendant Strevell-Paterson Finance Company sub-
mitted counter-affidavits to resist the Motion of the Plain-
tiff, as follows: Mr. Robert L·. Backman stated that he had 
searched the records and could not find the agreement of 
October 15, 1955 on file (R. 20); Mr. D. P. Allred stated 
that the Chattel Mortgages of the Defendant were filed 
(R. 21-22); the Clerk of the Federal Court attests to the 
fact that Mr. Sleeter had taken bankruptcy and that these 
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two accounts were listed on the schedules (R. 23); and 
finally, Mr. Sleeter states that the equipment placed on 
the agreement under the caption of "Rewrite of Machin-
ery in Plant'' was owned by Affiant prior to the execution 
of the agreement and was placed on the agreement as 
security "in order to give Martin Machinery a Chattel 
Mortgage and security for the Affiant to purchase the 
mercury dry-cleaning unit shown on said Contract" and 
that the equipment was never returned to ~Iartin Ma-
chinery prior to or at the time of the execution of the 
agreement (R. 24-25). Argument was had before the 
Court upon the Plaintiff's Motion of October 18, 1957, 
and the Court took the matter under advisement. On No-
vember 7, 1957, while the Court still had the matter under 
advisement and without leave of Court, the Plaintiff sub-
mitted a further affida.vi t ( R. 18-19). Thereafter, on the 
8th day of November, 1957, and without giving this De-
fendant a chance to anS\Yer said Affidavit, the Court made 
and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment in this matter (R. 26-30). It is from these 
Findings and Judgment that this Defendant appeals. 
STATE~IENT OF POINTS 
PorNT I. 
THE COURT ERRED .A.S ... ~ 1\I..:-\.TTER OF L.A.W 
IN GRANTING THE ~IOTION FOR SUMI\LA.RY 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE IS ---~ DEFINITE 
ISSUE AS TO THE FACTS. 
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ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
IN GRANTING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE IS A DEFINITE 
ISSUE AS TO THE FACTS. 
Courts should only grant Summary Judgment where 
the facts are clear and unequivocal. U.R.C.P. 56(c) pro-
vides in part as follows : 
'' ... The judgment sought shall be rendered forth-
with if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any maternal 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law ... " 
Professor Moore in his treatise on the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure has this comment on this particular 
rule: 
''The function of the summary judgment is to avoid 
a useless trial; and a trial is not only useless (sic) 
but absolutely necessary where there is a genuine 
issue as to any rna terial fact. In ruling on a mo·-
tion for summary judg1nent the court's function is 
• to determine whether such a genuine issue exists, 
not to resolve any factual issues." (Moore's Fed-
eral Practice, Vol. 6, p. 2101) (Emphasis added) 
"The courts are in entire agreement that the mov-
ing party for summary judgment has the burden 
of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to 
all the material facts, which, under applicable 
principles of substantive law, entitle him to judg-
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ment as a matter of law. The courts hold the 
mova:nt to a strict starndard. To satisfy his bur-
den the movant must make a showilng that is quite 
clear what the truth is, a.nd that excludes any real 
doubt as to the existen.ce of any genruine issue of 
material fact. Since it is not the function of the 
trial court to adjudicate genuine factual issues at 
the hearing on the motion for summary judg-
ment, in ruling on the motion all inferences of 
fact from the proofs proffered at the hearing must 
be drawn against the movant and in favor of the 
party opposing the motion. And the papers sup-
porting movant's position are closely scrutinized, 
while the opposing papers are indulgently treated, 
in determining whether the movant has satisfied 
his burden. 
''To satisfy the moving party's burden the evi-
dentiary material before the court, if taken as 
true, must establish the absence of any genuine 
issue of material fact, and it must appear that 
there is no real question as to the c-redibility of 
the evidentiary material, so that it is to be taken 
as true. If the nonexistence of any genuine issue 
of material fact is established by such credible 
evidence that on the facts and the la" the movant 
is entitled to judgment as a. matter of law, the 
motion should be granted, unless the opposing 
party shows good reason ''hy he is at the time of 
the hearing unable to present facts in opposition 
to the motion. If, ho,YeYer, the papers before the 
court disclose a real issue of credibility or, apart 
from credibility, fail to establish clearly that there 
is no genuine issue as to anY rna terial fact, the 
motion must be denied.'' ( JI ~ore's Federal Prac-
t,ice, Vol. 6, pp. ~123-2126) (Emphasis added) 
Mr. Sleeter clearly· states in his affidaYit that the 
items listed on the agr<.•ement under the heading "Re· 
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write of Machinery in Plant'' were placed on there for 
serurity in the form of a Chattel Mortgage (R. 24). Cer-
tainly the following issues are clearly raised by the 
pleadings and affidavits filed in this case: 
1. Whether or not the agreement dated October 
15, 1955, is a Chattel Mortgage or Conditional 
Sales Contract. 
2. Whether or not the items listed under '' Re-
write of Machinery in Plant'' were in fact con-
veyed to the Plaintiff for good and valuable 
consideration and to be the sole and separate 
property of Plaintiff which could be resold to 
the Defendant Sleeter. 
3. Whether or not the Plaintiff was doing busi-
ness in Utah and had never qualified. 
The evidence must be clear and unequivocal in order 
to support a Summary Judgment (Young v. Felornria 
( 1952) 121 Utah 646, 244 P. 2d 862 ( Cert. denied 344 
U. S. 885); Ulibarri v. Christenson, 2 Ut. 2d 367, 275 P. 
2d 170; Fountain v. Filson (1949) 336 U.S. 681, 69 S. Ct. 
754,93 L. Ed. 971; Holbrook et ux v. Webster's, Inc., et al, 
(1958) Case No. 8724, ______ U t. 2d ________ , ________ , P. 2d --------·) 
In the case .Arran Ferer d!; Sons v. Richfield Oil Cor-
poration, ( CCA 9, ( 1945) 150 F. 2d 12), a Motion for 
Summary Judgment was denied on an action on a con-
tract where the affidavit showed a conflict to exist. Head-
note No.1 of that case clearly states the Court's position: 
''Where plaintiff files an affidavit denying prior 
agreement between parties and alleging that plead-
ed agreement was the only one made and seeks a 
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summary judgment theron, and defendant files 
affidavits contradicting statements of plaintiff's 
affidavit the affidavits create a genuine issue as to 
a material fact requiring usual trial by witnesses, 
subject to cross-examination, and District Court 
should deny motion for summary judgment. Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 52(2), 28 
U.S.C.A. following section 723c." 
There appears to be no doubt but that the agree-
ment which is shown as Exhibit ''A'' (R. 16) was exe-
cuted on the 15th day of October, 1955, by Ralph A. Slee-
ter, Jr. The list of equipment shown on this agreement 
under the heading of ''Rewrite of Machinery in Plant'' 
was equipment that already belonged to nfr. Sleeter and 
of which he had possession in his plant here in Salt Lake 
City, Utah (R. 24). This equipment was never removed 
from his plant nor anything done to it (R. 24). The affi-
davit of Mr. Sleeter (R. 24) states that this equipment 
was placed on the agreement only to give a security to 
Martin Machinery for the purchase of the mercury dry 
cleaning unit shown on the lower portion of the agree-
ment. It '"·as only intended by him to give them, in the 
form of a Chattel ~Iortgage, a lien upon this equipment 
in order that it would guarantee the performance of this 
agreement to pay the balance. The affidaYit of Mr. C. 
Mardee Robinson (R. 18) referring to a bill of sale exe-
cuted by Mr. Ralph Sleeter on this equipment, when 
taken together \vith the agreement (R. 16-17) and the 
affidavit of Mr. Sleeter (R. 24), shows that this bill of sale 
was taken only as a subterfuge. This equipment "~as 
owned by Mr. Sleeter prior to the execution of this agree-
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ment, and this purported bill of sale is dated the ~arne day 
as the date on the agreement. The agreement shows an 
its face that Mr. Sleeter owned outright this equipment 
and credit is given on the agreement for the value of this 
equipment. The value of this equipment in the amount of 
$3,640.00 was Mr. Sleeter's which he had paid for and be-
longed to him prior to the execution of any bill of sale or 
this particular agreement. The agreement further shows 
that if Mr. Sleeter was buying all of this equipment he 
should have paid a sales tax on the full amount of 
$6,105.00, rather than paying the sales tax on the amount 
of only $1, 750.00, which is shown on the face of the agree-
ment as $35.00 and which is two per cent of the sale price 
of the dry cleaning unit. This shows further evidence that 
it was only intended by the parties that this one item 
should be sold and, in fact, the balance of the agreement 
is strictly to give security for the purchase price of this 
one item. Although the agreement appears to be in the 
form of a conditional sales contract, the Court may in-
quire, and should inquire, as to whether or not this is a 
conditional sales contract or, in fact, a chattel mortgage. 
This determination is a question of fact which should be 
submitted to the trial court rather than tried upon Sum-
mary Judgment. 
"Determination of the question, whether a par-
ticular transaction, is a conditional sale or a chat-
tel mortgage, in the final analysis, depends upon 
the intention of the parties, which is to be ascrr-
tained from their conduct, the attendant circum-
stwnces, and the terms of the agreement." (175 
A.L.R. 1378) (Emphasis added) 
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The attendant facts in this particular case appear 
quite obvious to show that this agreement was intended 
as a chattel mortgage and not a conditional sales contract. 
The question of whether or not an agreement is a condi-
tional sale or a chattel mortgage wherein the absolute 
sale takes place with the reservation of title as security 
has been considered by the courts in numerous cases and 
annotated in the following annotations : 17 A.L.R. 1427, 
43 A.L.R. 1252, 92 A.L.R. 311, and 17 5 A.L.R. 1372. The 
general tenor of all of these annotations is to the effect 
that the determination of whether or not a contract is a 
conditional sale or a chattel mortgage depends upon the 
intent of the parties, and as heretofore quoted, this intent 
is to be ascertained from their conduct and the attendant 
circumstances, as well as the terms and conditions of the 
agreement. This question of a conditional sales contract 
vs. a chattel mortgage is discussed in detail in 47 An1. Jur. 
''Sales,'' Sec, 833. Some of the statements extracted from 
that section are as follows: 
''Notwithstanding a proYision reserving title to an 
article until payment of the purchase price, a con-
tract may constitute an absolute sale. In passing 
upon the question whether a contract with a reser-
vation of title constitutes a conditional sale or a 
sale \vith a reser\?ation merely in the nature of a 
lien, the courts if they take the latter view of the 
contract, do not al\vays style it an absolute sale, 
but may characterize the transaction, as a whole, 
as a chattel mortgage." (Page 14) 
"I . b · t soJnetnnes ccon1es a close queshon to deter-
mine whether a coutract ·is one of absolute sale 
with a resercatio11 of title by u.'a.y of a chattel 
mortgage or collateral security~ or whether it .Zs a 
10 
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conditional sales contract with an absolute reser-
vation of title in the vendor, with payment of the 
purchase price a condition preceden.t to the pass-
ing of title. It is recognized that the determination 
of this question is always attended with some dif-
ficulty by reason of the narrow line of distinction 
between conditional sales contracts and chattel 
mortgages, each case depending on its peculiar or 
special circumstances. The real distinction be-
tween a conditional sale and an absolute sale with 
a mortgage back is that under the former the ven-
dor remains the owner, subject to the vendee-'s 
right to acquire the title by complying with the 
stipulated conditions; while under the latter the 
vendee immediately becomes the owner, subject to 
the lien created by the mortgage. A mortgage is a 
security for a debt, while a conditional sale is a 
transfer of ownership for a price paid, or to be 
paid, to become absolute on a particular event, or 
a purchase accompanied by an agreement to resell 
on particular terms, although it is said with refer-
ence to the latter transaction that the line between 
defeasible sales and chattel mortgages cannot be 
marked out by any general rule. In the case of a 
conditional sale, no present title vests in the ven-
dee, but his title rests upon the performance of the 
condition prescribed in the contract, while in the 
case of a common-law mortgage the title passes at 
once to the mortgagee, subject to be repassed on 
the performance of an express condition subse-
quent, or the mortgagee merely has a lien on the 
property in jurisdictions where a chattel mortgage 
does not pass title. The passing of the title is, 
therefore, the real test to determine the character 
of the sale as absolute with reservation of secur-
ity, or conditional. The chief criterion for deter-
mining the character of the trarn.saction is the in-
tention of the parties as disclosed by the entire 
contract, the circumstances attending to the trams-
11 
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action and conduct of the parties. The true nature 
of the'tra;n.saction is n.ot p·ermitted to be obscured 
by artifice, form, or superficial declaration of in-
tention. Such a construction should be adopted, if 
possible, as will harmonize and give effect to all 
the terms and provisions of the contract. Doubts 
will be resolved a.gainst a vendor when there is a 
purposeful ambiguity in the instrument designed 
to serve his purpose. Conditional sales are not 
favored in law, and where it is doubtful from the 
face of an instrument whether it is a conditional 
sale or a mortgage, the courts generally treat it as 
a mortgage, for such construction is more apt to 
attain~ the ends of justice and prevent fraud and 
oppression, because an error which converts a 
conditional sale into a mort gage is less injurious 
than an error which changes a mortgage into a 
conditional sale. Courts of equity do not favor con-
ditional sales, and they may pronounce an instru-
ment which resolves itself into a security for the 
performance of an act a mortgage, although at law 
it may be considered a conditional sale. However, 
even in courts of equity, the intention of the par-
ties is the principal thing to be regarded, and only 
in case of doubt and to prevent fraud will equity 
declare a transaction to constitute a mortgage 
rather than a conditional sale." (pp. 16-17) (Em-
phasis added) 
'' N ot,vi thstanding a c lanse reserving title in the 
seller, however, other provisions of the eontract 
or the circumstances surrounding the transaction 
may be so inconsistent "ith the theory of the re-
tention of title as to establish the dominant in-
tent to be to vest the title in the buyer, subject, of 
course, to the lien created by the reservation of 
ti tie. In such rase, the sale 'viii be construed to be 
absolute. In this regard it ma.y be said that in con· 
1~ 
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struing provisions in the contract by which .the 
vendor seeks rights other than the mere reserva-
tion of title to the property, the courts are not 
astute to hold a contract to be one of conditional 
sale, but will hold it to be one of absolute sale with 
a reservation of title amounting, at least in effect, 
to a chattel mortgage." (Page 20) 
The very thing attempted here by the Plaintiff, Mar-
tin l\Iachinery, Inc., in taking a deed on property belong-
ing to the Defendant Sleeter is to create a common law 
mortage. The common law mortgage is the absolute sale 
of the property by the mortgagor to the mortgagee sub-
ject to being redeemed according to the terms of the con-
tract between the parties. (See 10 Am. Jur. Chattel Mort-
gages p. 715) 
''Of course, the real distinction between an abso-
lute and a conditional sale is that the title passes 
when the sale is absolute, while it remains in the 
seller when the sale is conditional. The passing of 
the title is, therefore, the real test to determine the 
character of the sale in this regard. Whether the 
parties intend that the title shall pass is to be de-
termined from the circumstances attending the 
transaction, and the reserving title in the seller 
until payment of the purchase price indicates a 
conditional sale; but notwithstanding this clause, 
other provisions of the contract may be so incon-
sistent with the theory of the retention of title in the 
seller as to establish the dominant intent to be to 
vest the title in the buyer, subject, of course, to 
the lien created by the reservation of the title. In 
such case, the sale will be construed to be a bso-
lute. '' (Annotation ''What Amounts to a Con-
ditional Sale" 17 A.L.R. 1433) 
13 
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Since each case must be decided upon its own circum-
stances, as a general rule, there certainly could be no 
basis for the granting of the Motion for Summary Judg-
ment when all the circumstances and surrounding facts 
of the giving of the instrument have not been presented 
to the Court. 
''There is no general rule for determining whether 
a particular transaction is a mortgage or a con-
ditional sale and every case must be decided on its 
own circumstances. The legal aspect of the con-
tract in this respect depends upon the intention of 
the parties, to be ascertained by a consideration of 
the entire instrument and the surrounding cir-
cumstances, and not upon the form of the instru-
ment or the name which the parties may have given 
to it. However, certain tests which have been ap-
plied by the courts for arriving at the intention of 
the parties are considered at length in another 
article. 
"Courts of equity do not favor conditional sales; 
and where it is doubtful whether a transaction was 
intended as a conditional sale or a mortgage, they 
will pronounce it a mortgage, since they are dis-
posed to consider e,~ery deed, whatever its form, 
which resolYes itself into a security for the per-
formance of any act, as a mortgage. This is not 
the absolute rule, ho,,~eYer, for it is tempered by 
the rule that nothing is to be inferred "'\Yhich is 
contrary· to the clearly expressed intention of the 
parties. The burden of proof in dou-btful cases is 
on hi1n U'ho insists that the transaction was a con-
ditional sale to shou· that such zras the infetlfion of 
the parties." (10 ~1nr. Ju r. c~hattel niortgages, pp. 
722-723) (Emphasis added) 
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The agreement between the parties hereto if classi-
fied as a chattel mortgage does not give them any priority 
over Strevell-Paterson Finance Company. The Utah Code 
requires that a chattel mortgage unless the "personal 
property is delivered to and retained by the mortgagee,'' 
is not valid against the rights of any other person unless 
a copy thereof has been filed in the office of the county 
recorder wherein the mortgagor resides. (U.C.A. 1953, 
9-1-1) The record in this case shows that no copy was 
filed with the County Recorder's office in Salt Lake 
County. (R 20) 
It is admitted by the Appellant that this filing statute 
does not apply to a conditional sales contract except 
where the instrument is a bill of sale which shall have the 
effect of a mortgage or a lien upon the property. The 
statute covering this particular point is U.C.A. 1953, 9-1-1. 
''9-1-1. Requisites for Validity.- Unless the pos-
session of a personal property is delivered to and 
retained by the mortgagee, no mortgage thereof 
shall be valid as against the rights and interests of 
any person other than the parties thereto, unless : 
"(1) ... 
'' ( 2) The mortgage, or a copy thereof certified to 
be such by a notary public or other officer au-
thorized to take acknowledgments, is filed, but not 
for recordation, in the office of the recorder of the 
county where the mortgagor resides, or, in case 
he is a non-resident of this state, in the office of the 
recorder of the county or counties where the prop-
erty may be at the time of the execution of the 
mortgage.'' 
15 
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Furthermore it should be noted that in one of the 
' 
arguments of Plaintiff, as presented to the lower court, 
he indicated that the agreement, although signed here in 
the State of Utah by Mr. Sleeter, was not doing business 
in this State since the agreement must be submitted to 
the Plaintiff in Denver, Colorado, for acceptance. This 
is borne out by clause three of the agreement which reads 
In part: 
''This Contract shall become binding upon the 
Seller when approved by one of its duly authorized 
officers at its principal office in Denver, Colo-
rado, ... '' (R. 16) 
The rule of law is well established that a construction 
of the contract is made under the laws of the State in 
which the contract is made. (See Crofoot v. Thatcher, 
19 Utah 212, 57 P. 171, 75 Am. St. Rep. 725) 
''As far as it is possible to generalize upon the im-
portant preliminary question as to the place where 
contracts in general may be said to be completed, 
made, or executed, the rule may be laid down that 
if the parties to a prospecti\e contract are in dif-
ferent jurisdictions, the pla,ce u·here the last act is 
done which is necessary to co1nplete the contract 
and give it validity is regarded as the place in 
which the contract i.s 1nade or co1npleted." (11 Am. 
Jur. "Conflict of La,Ys," Sec. 100, p. 386) (Em-
phasis added) 
The Colorado law does not recognize a conditional 
sales contract as anything except a chattel mortgage inso-
far as the rights of third parties are coneerned. The 
Colorado Reuised Statutes of 1953 20-1-20 provide as 
' ' follows: 
16 
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"What conveyarnces have effect of chattel mort-
gages.-Except as provided in section 20-1-6 !he 
provisions of this article shall extend to all bills 
of sale, deeds of trust and other conveyances of 
personal property intended by the parties to have 
the effect of a mortgage or lien upon such 
property.'' 
The Colorado Supreme Court has held that a condi-
tional sales contract will not be recognized as leaving title 
in the vendor as against interested parties without notice 
and constitutes an absolute sale as against third persons. 
(See Puzzle Mining & Reduction Co. v. Morse Bros. Ma-
chinery & Supply Co., 24 Colo. App. 74, 131 P. 791; Turnr 
bull v. Cole, 70 Colo. 364, 201 P. 887; McClain v. Saran.ac 
Machinery Company, 94 Colo. 145, 28 P. 2d 1009). 
The Plaintiff may argue that this contract is one that 
is made in Utah, since the installation of the unit was to 
be made in Utah, and therefore the Utah law should apply. 
The rule of law quoted above is to the effect that the con-
tract is to be construed by the law of the State where the 
contract is made. This means that it is the place where 
the last act necessary to make a valid contract takes place, 
i.e., where several parties are to accept the offer and it 
requires several signatures before the agreement is bind-
ing, the place of the last signing is the place of the making 
of the contract. It is not the place where the last act in 
the performance of the contract is to take place. 
The Restatement on Conflicts, section 265, provides 
as follows: 
17 
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''The validity and effect of a mortgage of a chattel 
are determined by the law of the state where the 
chattel is at the time when the mortgage is 
executed.' ' 
"Comment. The law of the place where a chattel 
is determines the form necessary to the creation 
of a valid mortgage of the chattel. It also deter-
mines the validity of the mortgage in all other 
respects, both as between the parties thereto and 
as against third persons. So too, the law of the 
state where the chattel is at the time of the mort-
gage determines the nature and extent of the 
rights acquired thereunder ... '' 
Section 272 provides : 
"Whether a conditional sale is effective to enable 
the vendor to retain title is determined by the law 
of the state where the chattel is at the time of 
the sale.'' 
Williston on Sales, Vol. 2, Revised Edition, Section 
339 at Page 322, in discussing the question of the removal 
of a chattel from one State to another, states the 
following: 
''A distinction has been taken by a number of 
courts in rases "~here goods are bought on a con-
ditional sale for immediate removal to another 
State, and the seller either ships the goods him-
self or is a ''are of the bu~ ... er 's purpose. It has been 
held that the courts of the State to ''hich the prop-
erty is removed ''ill apply its o'Yn rules, though 
the conditional sale 'vas entered into in another 
State; but there is no g·eneral assent to this dis-
tinction, for other court~ apply the rule prevailing 
in the jurisdictions "There the conditional sale was 
made, although the goods ''ere to be removed im-
mediately to another jurisdiction.'' 
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Assuming that the contract is one that is made in 
Utah, then the question truly raised is whether or not the 
Plaintiff has been doing business in Utah such that it 
comes within the provisions of the Code requiring it to 
qualify. (U.C.A.1953, 16-8-3) The writer of this brief has 
personally checked with the Secretary of State's Office for 
the State of Utah and has been informed that even to the 
date of this writing that the Plaintiff, Martin Machinery, 
Inc., has never qualified to do business in Utah as required 
by U.C.A. 1953, 16-8-1. This is true despite the fact that 
the court found that the Plaintiff was a Colorado corpora-
tion "with authority to operate and carry on its business 
within the State of Utah." (R. 26) There was never any 
evidence presented to the court to the effect that the 
Plaintiff had ever qualified to carry on business in the 
State of Utah. In fact, the evidence presented by the 
Plaintiff was to show that the Plaintiff was not carrying 
on any business in the State of Utah (R. 18-19). The find-
ing of the court is contrary to all of the evidence pre-
sented. If the finding of the Court is to stand, when in 
truth and in fact, the Plaintiff has never qualified with 
U.C.A. 1953, 16-8-1, then Plaintiff truly comes within the 
provisions of U.C.A. 1618-3 and cannot sue on this 
agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Appellant submits that the agree-
ment entered into on October 15, 1955, is in fact a chat-
tel mortgage since the items shown thereon were given for 
the purpose of securing the payment for the purchase of 
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one item known as a ''mercury dry cleaning unit.'' The 
affidavit submitted by Mr. Sleeter substantiates this posi-
tion, and the Court should have had all of the evidence 
surrounding the facts and circumstances in the creation 
of this instrument. It is further submitted that there is 
sufficient conflict l.n the facts and evidence as presented 
that the Court should, as a matter of law, have denied the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DEAN E. CONDER 
NIELSEN AND CONDER 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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